could be exported to Haiti. 6 Latin American troops undertook responsibilities related to local communications, infrastructure, public health and civil construction. On many occasions, improvised solutions would substitute for the lack of international aid in the construction of roads, schools and hospitals and the improvement of basic sanitary conditions. In this context, MINUSTAH became a benchmark experiment for Latin American military forces regarding humanitarian assistance logistics.
Non-military Latin American cooperation also made major contributions in Haiti. As well as Cuba's medical presence, Venezuela provided key help by supplying energy. The first years of MINUSTAH were especially important for regional South-South cooperation in the areas of health, food security, education, institutional strengthening and infrastructure (Malacalza 2017) . In addition, Latin American social organisations were active participants in this effort-such were the cases of Techo para mi País and Viva Rio. After the 2010 earthquake, Latin American cooperation in Haiti decreased dramatically and irreversibly. The expanded presence of DAC donors, together with US/EU NGOs, led international aids to focus exclusively on basic humanitarian needs.
Regional footprints blurred even more once MINUSTAH entered a state of fatigue. Over-stretching of military presence went hand in hand with the outburst of a cholera epidemic and the repeated human rights violations committed by UN troops. In the 2015-2017 period, individual governments decided to leave Haiti instead of working together on a regional coordinated withdrawal. Dispersion was more a reflection of the growing political fragmentation in Latin America than of military rivalries.
The experience in Haiti represented a chance for Latin American military forces to share peace-building capacities. For all ex-MINUSTAH contributors, combined regional military preparedness in humanitarian relief and stabilization tasks would be positively absorbed in other domestic and international realities.
Concepts and contexts
This text intends to trace a middle ground between military studies and humanitarian action analysis by connecting the concepts of postmodern military forces and armed humanitarianism. In order to do this, it begins with the assumption that both concepts can be intertwined to address the legacies of the Latin American military experience in Haiti.
The concept of postmodern military forces applies to armed forces prepared to face non-traditional menaces posed by post-Cold War security agendas that involve a renewed assortment of missions (Moscos, Williams and Segal, 2000:1-11) . In this context, threats may relate to domestic unrest, terrorism, organized crime, natural disaster, civil wars among others. In all cases, interaction with social actors and organizations become crucial and adaptation to specific responsibilities is more complex. Expanded civil-military articulation is linked to non-traditional military missions, which may be of international nature authorized by non-national entities, implying the internationalization of military forces. Post-modern military forces must deal with unclear enemies and effectiveness becomes of major importance as a source of mission legitimization. Yet… "Chaos and disorder are poor substitutes for an obvious enemy for this purpose" (Williams, 2000:274) .
The concept of armed humanitarianism applies to the assorted relief actions undertaken by the military in contexts of humanitarian crisis. While the essence of a postmodern military force rests on the capacity to fulfill duties that involve dealing with society, the focus of armed humanitarianism is relief itself and the contribution of military presence to assure its effectiveness. From a traditional military perspective, the idea of armed humanitarianism can be controversial as it infers military presence as part of a bigger humanitarian picture. Conceptual and practical collisions are hardly avoidable, once this prism affects military autonomy (Pion-Berlin, 2016:120) .
At the present time, the provision of military logistic support plays a crucial part to assure access for civilian relief workers to severely affected environments. Logistic expertise allows the military to speed up help in disastrous contexts. They can hurry up search, evacuation, demolition, debris removal and reconstruction operations, as well as food and water distribution. The combination of new operational approaches with concrete developments in conflictive areas opens up a space for new debates regarding the militarization of humanitarian actions and its impact upon the relationship between the military and traditional humanitarian actors. Armed humanitarianism brings in new dynamics in the interaction between political, military and humanitarian actors that stimulated politicization and militarization of humanitarian action (Sezgin and Dijkzeul, 2016:4) .
Differences between Western and non-Western approaches have emerged, entailing questions of military interaction, interoperability and effectiveness (Carperter and Kent, 2016:151) . Setting the time for armed intervention has become a point of controversy. The question is whether military forces come first or last as providers of humanitarian assistance. This debate reflects on recent OCHA guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies-the 'MCDA Guidelines (OCHA, 2006) and the Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, known as the Oslo Guidelines (OCHA, 2007) . Another conceptual and practical dispute concerns the relationship between international humanitarian actors and the military (Metcalfe, Giffen and Elhawary, 2012) . Civil-military coordination in UN peace missions nowadays must adjust to multitask mandates approved by the Security Council. Responsibilities on the ground show a new "interface between military and civilian components of the mission, as well as with the humanitarian, development actors in the mission area" (UN DPKO/DFS, 2010. cited in Metcalf, Giffen and Elhawary, 2012:2).
7 Multi-task missions become even more challenging in the context of global securitization.
After 9-11, the "war against poverty" became associated to the "war against terror" (Easterly, 2016) 8 and armed humanitarianism was linked to humanitarian securitiza-tion. Global humanitarian action increased in close connection with post 9-11 foreign military intervention. Accordingly, in 2015 the 10 major recipients of humanitarian aid were Syria (12,5%), Yemen (9,1%), Jordania (5,6%), South Sudan (5,5%), Iraq (5,2%), Palestine (5,2%), the Democratic Republic of Congo (5%), Lebanon (4,8%), Ethiopia (3,6%) and Nepal (2,7%) (Development Initiatives, 2017). Severe humanitarian crises caused by military intervention became especially dramatic in the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, where the premises of human security suffered profound transfiguration (Sanahuja and Schunemann, 2012:25) . In this context, global threats justified violent responses with direct impact upon local population, deepening the casual link between military intervention and humanitarian crises. Besides, securitization of humanitarian practices curtailed the magnanimity of liberal-principled relief as it affects the neutrality/independence/impartiality dogma of humanitarian practices.
Certain scenarios included in the global humanitarian sensor coincide with new security threats on the international postmodern military radar. This has been the case of the violent realities dominated by organized crime, drug traffic and gangs activities. Military international/national action to fight organized crime and gangs have added new complexities to civil-military coordination in UN-led missions (Liyn, 2018) . Several multilateral missions show that UN rules of engagement are hardly realistic when organized crime and gang activities represent the central threat targeted by international military forces 10 . Combining stabilization tasks with human rights regulations has been particularly challenging. A myriad of UN missions have had to face such challenges: MINUSTAH in Haiti, MONUC in Central African Republic, UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire, MONUSC in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUSC, UNMIL in Liberia, and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (Liyn, 2018:5) . In this context, MINUSTAH is acknowledged for the results obtained in military regional leadership and 'proactive response' to stabilization responsibilities prescribed by the Security Council. (Liyn, 2018:12) . Hence, the expanded securitization of humanitarian practices coincides with the blurring of frontiers between violence, humanitarian hardship and severe institutional deficits in public security.
The Latin America-Caribbean fit
Geographical distance from hot international conflict zones curtails Latin American involvement with global securitization. Nevertheless, armed violence and public insecurity has expanded the region's presence on the securitized humanitarian radar.
11 Latin America has become the region with the highest record of deaths caused by armed vio-lence (SIPRI, 2015) . Brazil alone ranks as the most violent country in the world.
12 Organized crime, drug trafficking and gang activities, particularly in urban peripheries, added to police and military repressive responses, are responsible for the death of thousands of people, for continuous human rights violations and the collective victimization of civil populations. Besides, violence and coercive territorial control have produced massive forced migration in different parts of Latin America, Colombia and the Northern triangleUnited States, Mexico and Guatemala being especially worth mentioning (Gonzalez, Mcauliffe and Laczko, 2016; Rangel 2016) . In this context, military participation in the fight against crime has been on the rise in Latin America. In different contexts, public opinion perceives military intervention to combat criminal organizations as a necessary solution to offset ineffective and fraudulent police performance (Pion-Berlin and Carreras, 2017). Military crime-fight operations aim to reduce victimization and overcome widespread fear in local communities in which police practices have become part of the problem. The political and sociological complexities of this process in Central America and Mexico have become a topic of expanded concern in academic, activist and journalistic critical writings (Trevino-Rangel, 2016) . Military engagement in organized crime fighting in Central America and Mexico takes place in the context of US cooperation, mostly linked to broad antidrug operations. Military intervention in crime-fighting operations in the Northern part of Latin America does not seem to be related to knowledge acquired in PKO. Yet, the connection between military involvement in peace missions and crime fighting has become emblematic in the case of Brazil, particularly of Rio de Janeiro.
Addressing public security deficits as a humanitarian issue is controversial in the region. Multilateral organizations -Organization of American State, European Union, OCHAUN -and a widespread network of NGOs, with growing presence in the region, insist upon perception.
13 Local and national security authorities resist accepting to address these realities as part of an international humanitarian agenda. At the same time, international organizations and actors resent the limited attention to these realities by the global humanitarian system, particularly when compared to other regions that receive more funding and benefit from a vast number of multilateral initiatives (Wilson Center, 2017) .
On the other hand, preparedness for humanitarian relief regarding natural disaster has increased and ameliorated in Latin American and the Caribbean. An expanded network of multilateral initiatives adds to preventing and pro-active national programs in most of the countries in the region 14 . This development comes hand in hand with the 12 In 2017, the annual rate of homicides in Brazil nearly 60.000. This figure overcomes the added rates of United States, China, Europa, Northern Africa, Japan, Indonesia, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Available: http://metrocosm.com/homicides-brazil-vs-world/ (Accessed:03.20.2018) 13 In 2015, UNHCR offices were inaugurated in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. In July 2016 UNHCH and the OAS held a high-level meeting to address the lacking protection conditions for civilians in the Northern triangle area of Central American. In June 2017,Humanitarian Practice Network, linked to Overseas Development Initiative, edited a special issue of Humanitarian Exchange (n.69), entitled "The humanitarian consequences of violence in Central America". Available: https://odihpn.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/he-69-web.pdf (Accessed 07.20.2017) 14 Among the multilateral organizations dedicated to natural disaster are: CDEMA (Caribbean Association for Disaster Control), CAPRADE (Andean committee for disaster prevention and attention), CEPREDENAC (Center for coordination of natural disaster prevention in Central America); REHU (Mercosur specialized noticeable expansion of military engagement in contexts of humanitarian distress caused by natural disaster. Different formats of institutional arrangements have a built-in military component in Latin American governmental structures that assist environmental emergencies (Pion-Berlin, 2016:113-141; Resdal, 2016:68-78) . Armed humanitarianism tasks lead to the enhancement of public visibility and to stronger ties with the locals. Dissemination of humanitarian action executed by Defense Ministries in each national context show a shared interest to "advertise" their accomplishments (Pion-Berlin, Ugues and Esparza, 2011).
Expanded military presence in humanitarian emergencies does reflect a new phase in civil-military relations in the region. What tensions may emerge that endanger the rule of law and stretch the terrain of "legitimate" use of force and dissuasive methods is yet to be further developed in military studies in the region. Besides a priority in national defense policies, natural disaster is perceived as a security threat by the OAS 15 and has been included as a cooperation priority for the South American Defense Council
16
. National and foreign involvement in natural disaster has stimulated regional inter-military networking to exchange expertise and share learning processes 17 . An extensive agenda of venues, exercises and collaboration programs take place year-round to update and reciprocate capabilities among Latin American armed forces.
Latin American armed humanitarianism has been coached by the US South Command 18 . United States' military engagement in humanitarian response to natural disaster gained unprecedented importance in 2005 after Hurricane Katrine, which devastated the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. Training in relief capabilities became a core concern in the preparation of force deployment at home and abroad. The US military has built an active agenda of Inter-American coordinated humanitarian action -particularly in the Caribbean and Central America. Consequently, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief have become a central concern in InterAmerican military summits. The US has been pushing for a standardized system of military disaster relief and improved coordination procedures with civil actors in disaster contexts. 19 (Hirst, 2009; Tokatlian, 2005) . Political questioning focused mainly on the implications of reintroducing military forces in public security affairs, considering their responsibility in past human right violations. As previously mentioned, Haiti did not represent an exceptional case of UN peace missions involvement in crime and gang fighting. Yet it has become an emblematic case of experimentation, as revealed by the case of Brazil and the connection established between MINUSTAH experience and the military intervention in Brazilian slums known as favelas. Military intervention in Rio de Janeiro to inhibit crime and drugtraffic activities had been taking place since the 1990's 23 . Replication of methods experimented in the periphery of Port au Prince has been narrated in the literature on the complexities of public security in Brazil, and vice versa (Hirst and Nasser, 2014; Zaluar and Barcellos, 2014 . From this prism, 'operational conditions' in Brazil are considered much worse than in Haiti, especially considering the differences regarding commitment and determination of both UN and local authorities. Following the same argument, accomplishments in Haiti have not been easy to replicate in Brazil.
After the 2010 earthquake, Haitian public security deteriorated dramatically. Together with the loss of local police members and the physical destruction of the Haitian prison system, a new generation of gangs emerged with a more fragmented territorial presence and new violent practices. In the years to come, Brazilian military faced challenges that blurred the distinction between stabilization tasks and armed humanitarianism. MINUSTAH police and military contingents dealt simultaneously with a severe humanitarian crisis, the chaotic presence of external actors and gang resurgence. In 2016, Hurricane Matthew struck the Southwestern part of the Haitian territory with dramatic devastating effects. Even though the zones in Haiti under Brazilian control were not affected, Brazilian battalions immediately engaged in relief actions to ensure help would arrive safely.
27
Brazil concluded its mission in Haiti on October 10, 2017 leaving behind more than thirteen year of MINUSTAH military command. At the time, withdrawal from Haiti coincided with a renewed and more thorough military intervention in Rio de Janeiro. The decision to intervene came from the federal government in response to the escalation of violence and fear within a context of institutional and moral collapse of both the local police and political authorities. Lessons from the Haitian experience, though overstated in the media, became less relevant than the accelerated politicization regarding the decision itself. In Brazil, military intervention has become growingly controversial in the face of human rights violation risks and the utilization of methods that may be contrary to the state of law. A broad spectrum of responsibilities assumed in intervention involve dealing with local political and institutional entanglements that go far beyond those faced by MINUSTAH military command. Armed forces intervention in the fight against crime and drug trafficking in Brazil, particularly in Rio de Janeiro, is part of a long process of poverty criminalization (Franco, 2014:73-76 ). An indication of the poor results obtained with military presence has been the continuous escalation of political violence, related to the nexus between crime, gang and police corruption.
Final remarks
It seems to be more plausible to acknowledge the importance of MINUSTAH for Latin American military experimentation than to perceive the mission as a source of transformation for Haiti. The conditions on the island, after more than thirteen years of MINUSTAH, are far from promising. Economic and social indicators cause great concern. A population of approximately 10.5 million faces dramatic realities, such as: 40% illiteracy, 50% below poverty line, and 28% in extreme poverty. Only 12.2% of the Haitian population has access to Internet services, 25% enjoy basic sanitation and 50% have access to drinking water. Haiti is the country with the poorest infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere; less than 20% of its territory has paved roads 28 . The chances that Latin America can contribute to ameliorate this reality have decreased after MINUSTAH was dismantled. The end of the logistic support offered by Latin Americana troops to cooperation and humanitarian activities add to the growing disdain of present governments in the region to maintain non-military presence in Haiti. The growing irrelevance of ties with Latin America will lead to the creation of a new cycle of marginalization for Haiti in the international community.
This text has aimed to show how, as in other parts of the world, armed humanitarianism and postmodern military capabilities have been confluent in Latin America and the Caribbean. MINUSTAH has been an important point of reference for Latin American armed forces in humanitarian relief capacitation in contexts of natural disaster. The experience in Haiti has also improved military preparedness in the fight against organized crime and gang activities. Brazil has provided particularly intense feedback in its experience regarding public security responsibilities.
After October 2017, Latin American military experience in Haiti has become a regional legacy that will move beyond MINUSTAH. Military forces represent states which "carry their histories around with them and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future." (Williams, 2000:266) . This inevitably entails cultural, political and institutional coherence between military performance in Haiti and in other international and domestic contexts.
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